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State Legitimacy and Terrorism
Daniel Masters and Patricia Hoen
Department of Public and International Affairs, University of North Carolina-
Wilmington, Wilmington, NC
Studies that focus on the causes of terrorism often overlook the issue of legitimacy.
Ehud Sprinzak first spoke about the relationship between legitimacy and terrorism to
explain why mobilized groups transition from political opposition movements to terror-
ism. This study advances upon this analysis by assessing the relationship between a
state’s legitimacy and the occurrence of domestic terrorism. The data suggest that legit-
imacy is a robust predictor of terrorism and merits further investigation as a causal
variable.
Keywords: State Legitimacy, Structural Causes of Terrorism, Terrorism
INTRODUCTION
Revolutions, civil wars, and insurgencies of all types are often an outcome of
a certain set of structural conditions within a given state. Domestic terrorism,
as a form of insurgency, is no exception to this rule. The challenge we face is in
trying to isolate the structural conditions that make domestic terrorism more
likely. We know that terrorism can happen in any society at any point in time.
However, we also know that certain states tend to experience more terrorist
events than others. By understanding the intersection between structural con-
ditions and terrorism, we can further our understanding of the dynamics that
result in higher rates of terrorism for some states and not others, and ideally,
of how to better defuse insurgent terrorist problems as they emerge.
Structural conditions are those that are considered enduring over time
and outside the control of individuals, rather than those that involve the
active choice of individuals and groups.1 Jeffrey Ian Ross (1993) identifies
three broad structural factors that precipitate domestic oppositional ter-
rorism: geography, modernization, and the political system.2 Among these
broad structural factors, the political system and modernization are the
most scrutinized. Within the subset of the political system, attention tends
to focus on two characteristics, the first being regime characteristics like
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the Democracy–Autocracy continuum, or political regulation/competition and
executive constraints. The second condition is state stability (failed or weak
states). Studies on these political regime characteristics show wide variation
in their explanatory utility, resulting in assertions that the accumulation of
knowledge on structural causes of terrorism is very low.3
Meanwhile, little attention has been devoted to the issue of state legit-
imacy. Ehud Sprinzak first proposed the hypothesis that terrorism is the
outcome of a process of delegitimation.4 In short, legitimacy is tied to moral
and instrumental dimensions of the state referring to what people think a
state should be doing, and how those ideas translate into outcomes.5 States
are best able to secure their legitimacy when their institutions perform well
in the interests of the population. Terrorism itself is a strategy employed by
oppositional groups to challenge the legitimacy of the state. The onset of ter-
rorism is likely related to subgroup perceptions regarding the low legitimacy
of the state. However, it is difficult to isolate that specific relationship, as mea-
sures of legitimacy based on public opinion reflect majoritarian perspectives
and are not sensitive enough to capture subgroup perceptions. However, we
can approach the relationship between legitimacy and terrorism from a dif-
ferent angle: performance. The way a state responds to terrorist threats can
enhance or damage their legitimacy. If the state’s legitimacy is damaged, it can
embolden the terrorist group, resulting in more attacks.
This study explores the nexus of state legitimacy and terrorism. The two
sections that follow present a wide-ranging discussion on legitimacy as a
variable to explain political outcomes, and a narrower discussion on the rela-
tionship between legitimacy and terrorism. In these sections, we lay bare
the deep challenges in using legitimacy as a causal variable for domestic
oppositional terrorism. At the same time, we feel that the relationship needs
to be explored to its fullest potential rather than dismiss it because of the
challenges associated with using legitimacy. Next we lay out the methods for
investigating the relationship between legitimacy and domestic oppositional
terrorism. The analysis uses the legitimacy scale from the State Fragility
Index, and its components (security legitimacy, political legitimacy, economic
legitimacy, and social legitimacy) and domestic terrorist events are extracted
from the Global Terrorism Database. We present two analyses of the data,
a descriptive analysis and a multivariate analysis. In both sets of analyses,
the relationship between domestic oppositional terrorist events and legitimacy
is robust. When the analysis shifts toward the components of the legitimacy
index, political and security legitimacy account for a very high percent change
in the number of terrorist events observed. In short, legitimacy is a robust
variable that can explain the observed rates of domestic terrorism in a country.
The analysis suggests that states that manage to legitimate themselves fair
better against domestic terrorism, than do states that face delegitimation chal-
lenges. More to the point, terrorism within a state may have less to do with how
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the political regime is configured (democratic/authoritarian, strong/weak) and
more to do with its performance in managing conflict.
LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES
Legitimacy is one of the more important, yet troubling, concepts for students
of political behavior. Legitimacy is central to understanding phenomena like
political stability, revolutionary action, and development, to name a few. Yet
legitimacy is believed to be such an abstract, immeasurable, and obscure
concept as to defy effective measurement for models of political phenomena.
Despite these hurdles, scholars have decided it is better to try to measure legit-
imacy and incorporate it into behavioral models than to simply hand wave at
it and move on to other distal factors to account for the political phenomena
they seek to explain. Our goal here is to explore the relationship between state
legitimacy and terrorism. To get to that particular relationship, it serves us
best to first delve into the general concept of legitimacy, as well as its utilities
and limits as an explanatory variable.
There are two ways to consider legitimacy. First, legitimacy is a form
of soft power that provides states more opportunities to effect change and
development.6 To conceptualize legitimacy as soft power means that trust
serves as a foundation for the interplay between the state and society. In this
sense, a crisis of legitimacy sets in when the rulers are seen as taking actions
(political change) to advance their self-interest and their supporters, but not
the broader society.7 Second, legitimacy can be seen as an indicator of a state’s
capacity to manage political affairs, particularly conflict. Put more precisely,
every state always possesses greater capabilities to defeat insurgents. However,
if the regime is undermined by elite divisions, conflicts between government
leaders and elites, insurgencies can sustain themselves.8 How a state is able to
use its resources (military, taxing authority, police, and regulatory authority)
in order to meet the challenges that the state faces matters.9
These two perceptions of legitimacy are not mutually exclusive. Rather,
they tend to emphasize the different features of the concept. That is to say that
legitimacy is related to a moral dimension and an instrumental dimension. It is
moored to what people think (what a state should be doing with its resources),
how those thoughts define interests, identities, and motivations, and how
behavior attached to these interests translate into outcomes.10 The state
experiences enhanced legitimacy when its institutions are able to perform well.
Moving from conceptual definition to causal variable introduces problems
for scholars. Legitimacy tends to have an iterative impact on political struc-
tures (legitimacy may shape the political structures of a state, while the
political structures of a state may impact legitimacy). From this understanding,
the question becomes, how can we isolate legitimacy from its position as
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either a cause of certain phenomena or as an effect of certain phenomena?
Additionally, legitimacy is plagued by the fact that outcomes associated with
increasing or decreasing legitimacy are complex and may be nonlinear. For
instance, one state may respond to declining legitimacy by seeking ways to
improve its performance. Other states may seek out replacement support struc-
tures by doing things like coercing opposition groups to demobilize them or
elevating core constituencies into the elite power structures.11 In other words,
it is difficult to assert direct or linear causal relationships. We must be skepti-
cal and appreciate the fine crevices in which legitimacy operates and matters
as a causal variable.12
For instance, the performance of a state is traceable to its legitimacy. The
task of governing a society requires (at times) that states make unpopular
choices (e.g. raise taxes, redistribute resources to enhance equality). Making
unpopular demands on the population is facilitated best by a state that is seen
as a “rightful ruler.”13 If a state is not legitimate, when it makes unpopular
decisions (regardless of how appropriate the decision may be), citizens may
interpret the decision outcome as a reflection of self-interests (to enhance the
position of rulers, or supporters of the rulers) rather than for the benefit of soci-
ety writ large. What this suggests is that a state may have strong institutional
capacities and still suffer a crisis of legitimacy.14 Bruce Gilley states it more
plainly, noting that legitimate states constrain incentives to defect from state
mandates, while illegitimate states are likely to observe citizens acting against
the social order in order to satisfy their demands.15
This final point moves us from the general discussion on legitimacy to a
more specific discussion on the relationship between legitimacy and terrorism.
Ehud Sprinzak asserts that the presence of terrorist groups and terrorist activ-
ity presupposes a crisis of legitimacy. But we must ask if that is truly the case.
In this sense, we need to be conscious of the notion that legitimacy is complex
and determine the way in which legitimacy may matter to the occurrence of
terrorism.
LEGITIMACY AND TERRORISM
To frame our discussion, it is best to start with the works of the late Ehud
Sprinzak, who urged us, as students of terrorism studies, to look at the nexus
of legitimacy and terrorism in order to explain the emergence, and even decline,
of terrorist groups in society. In his view, terrorism is the product of how active
political groups perceive the legitimacy of the state, its actors, and its poli-
cies. In other words, it is the course of state–society interaction that makes
terrorism possible. As perceptions of a state’s legitimacy decrease, the rate of
terrorism increases.16
The primary emphasis of the theory is to explain the microlevel process of
group radicalization. The marginalization of a political group is an important
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a 
W
ilm
in
gt
on
] 
at
 0
8:
01
 2
7 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
3 
State Legitimacy and Terrorism 341
step that begins the process of delegitimation.17 The group feels increasingly
estranged from their government every day, and the people’s confidence in their
government slowly withers away.18 It is a shift in attitude that may ultimately
predispose the regime to political violence. Sprinzak refers to this stage of
delegitimation as a crisis of confidence, where there is a negative assessment
of specific rulers and/or policies, but no one has directly challenged them.19 If
conflict continues in a society, there is a possibility for an alternate ideology or
cultural norm to arise in protest of the regime. Sprinzak refers to this stage as
a conflict of legitimacy, where citizens begin to directly challenge the regime
through protests, vandalism, and even low-scale violence. The role of the con-
flict of legitimacy is to denote the presence of radicalization within previously
moderate groups.20 However, during the conflict of legitimacy stage the precon-
ditions for terrorism are not yet complete, and the radicals require a political
additive in order to convert to terrorist activity.
There is a point where the acts of the regime have a greater possibility of
resulting in malignant effects. Sprinzak admits that in order for a terrorist act
to be morally acceptable, there must be a crisis of legitimacy, where a group will
undergo an extreme mental transformation and “free themselves from the yoke
of conventional morality.”21 Upon this crisis, legitimacy may act as a precipi-
tant of terrorist behavior. As Martha Crenshaw states, “Finally, an event occurs
that snaps the terrorists’ patience with the regime. Government action is now
seen as intolerably unjust, and terrorism becomes not only a possible decision
but a morally acceptable one. The regime has forfeited its status as the stan-
dard of legitimacy. For the terrorist, the end may now justify the means.”22 An
event or decision occurs, and a crisis of legitimacy infects the state. It is the
integrity of the social fabric that connects the regime and the latent radical
group that becomes the determining factor for terrorism.
Yet, Sprinzak also notes that some terrorist organizations do not have
grievances with the regime and act on other purposes not directly related to
state legitimacy. Right-wing terrorist organizations centered on racial or reli-
gious divisions in society have “particularistic” motives, whereas groups that
oppose the regime have a “universalistic” purpose. Particularistic groups rarely
see themselves connected to the regime because they are in opposition to a
particular group or faction in society and not to the “establishment” in its
entirety. This skews the validity of the previous assertion that the process of
delegitimation is a product of conflict with the regime. Despite this caveat,
Sprinzak does not abandon the assertion that delegitimation is the basis for ter-
rorism. Instead, Sprinzak dubs the process of delegitimation within right-wing
groups as “split” or “dual” delegitimization.
In the case of dual delegitimation, the terrorist organization has a
consistent grievance with a nongovernmental faction while undergoing a
watered-down process of delegitimation with the regime. This is a process of
“uneven radicalization,” where all the stages of delegitimation are present but
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occur sporadically against two separate entities in society. The particularistic
extremists see an ethnicity or race as having an illegitimate position in society
and the regime as unwilling to act against that illegitimate position. Thus, a
split delegitimation occurs between the radical organization, a nongovernmen-
tal group, and the regime. The legitimacy of the regime also depends on their
willingness to snuff out illegitimate groups in society.23
By the reasoning presented here, the relationship between legitimacy
and terrorism is straightforward: as legitimacy decreases, terrorism increases.
However, as stated above, we must be critical. Terrorism is a form of inter-
nal conflict. As Bruce Gilley states, the relationship between legitimacy and
internal conflict is “complex and uncertain” at best.24 The question remains,
can we tease apart where legitimacy fits into the causal picture? Is terrorism a
symptom of a state’s failure to legitimate itself? Is legitimacy a consequence of
terrorism?
One issue is the fact that internal conflict, terrorism in particular, is the
product of minority group action and does not necessarily involve a majority
of the population. Rather, it reflects the views of smaller groups. Legitimacy
is a broader condition. There will be variation between subgroup views on the
legitimacy of a state and the majority population. Hence, it is likely that sub-
groups may see a state as illegitimate, but the majority of society sees the
state as legitimate.25 Terrorism can exist in this environment and lack a clear
link between state legitimacy and group behavior. For instance, during the
1980s, Chinese policy had focused on integration of the Xinjiang region into
the broader Chinese society. In the 1990s, a shift occurs in the direction of
assimilation and a dilution of the Uyghur identity.26 In response, we observe a
surge in separatist terrorism by Uyghur groups from the 1990s into the first
decade of the 2000s.
The Uyghur case captures much of the difficulty in using legitimacy as
a causal variable to explain terrorism. First, measures of legitimacy based
on mass majoritarian measures (public opinion) are too insensitive to capture
aggrieved subgroups and their opinions on state legitimacy. Second, Gilley sug-
gests that the Uyghur conflict may be exacerbated by China’s legitimacy. Since
the state is seen as legitimate by the broader population, there is little pres-
sure to respond to the interests of the subgroup, which may encourage greater
violence by the subgroup in order to persuade the opinions of the majority to
address the demands of the unreconciled subgroup.27 From these two problems,
Gilley urges scholars to look beyond legitimacy to other structural variables,
like regime type, in order to explain internal conflict.28
There are two ways to respond to this conclusion. First, states that are
broadly legitimate will still likely experience some terrorism. But the num-
ber of terrorist incidents is likely low. China is legitimate in the eyes of the
broader population,29 but not so much among the Uyghurs. In this case, the
predicted relationship between terrorism and legitimacy holds up. We do not
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observe much terrorist activity. The overall trend shows 3.75 terrorist attacks
per year from 1970 to 2005 and 8. 73 terrorist attacks in the period following
the change in China’s policy toward Uyghur integration.30 Being a legitimate
state does not lead to the conclusion that there will be zero conflict incidents,
but rather that legitimate states will experience less and be better positioned
to manage the incidents of conflict as they arise. China is legitimate and does
not experience much terrorism over time or in specific telescoped periods of
time. An aggrieved population may be more active, but their increased terrorist
activity does not amount to a major terrorist threat. The Uyghur case is impor-
tant to us because it does reveal the truth that perceptions of legitimacy that
might drive terrorist behavior are local, among subgroups, and not necessarily
reflective of the broader population.
A second way to respond to Gilley’s conclusion is to demonstrate that
it is premature and misses the broader picture of the relationship between
terrorism and legitimacy. Beginning with the latter assertion, Audrey Cronin
asserts that terrorism involves strategies of leverage that include provocation,
polarization, and mobilization.31 The goals are to (a) force a state to vigorously
respond to terrorist attacks, (b) drive regime responses to the right so that
the population is forced to choose between the terrorist cause and repression
by the state, and (c) recruit and rally the masses.32 Terrorists understand
from the outset that they are not broadly legitimate actors and that states, by
contrast, generally are. The goal of terrorist violence is to force a state to reveal
its interests in power over serving the interests of the people. If successful, ter-
rorism can then begin a process of eroding the legitimacy of the state. In short,
terrorism is a fight over legitimacy between the terrorist group and the state.
What we are now left with is a chicken–egg argument between legiti-
macy and terrorism. Sprinzak asserts that delegitimation begets terrorism.
Meanwhile, Cronin appears to assert that terrorism begets delegitimation.
The answer to the riddle is that the relationship is iterative. Low legitimacy
among subgroups is likely the genesis of oppositional political movements,
which may include terrorist activity. But sustained campaigns of terrorism,
where rates of violence remain high and consistent over longer periods of time,
likely result from polarized state responses that seek to restore lost legitimacy
in the face of terrorist attacks designed to elicit polarized counterstrikes. The
important distinction here is that terrorist attacks alone are not necessarily
damaging to the state’s legitimacy. Instead it is how the state reacts, and then
it is the attack–counterattack dynamic that matters to the legitimacy of the
state. Going back to the Uyghur example, if Uyghur groups (that use terrorist
tactics) limit operations to the Xinjiang region, and China responds with
extreme repression, the impact of the repression is narrowly felt in society, and
the rebound to the state’s legitimacy is likely low. However, if Uyghur groups
are able to export their attacks to the economic and political centers of China,
and the Chinese government opts for repressive tactics that impact a broader
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a 
W
ilm
in
gt
on
] 
at
 0
8:
01
 2
7 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
3 
344 D. Masters and P. Hoen
segment of society, there would likely be some impact on the state’s legitimacy.
We assert that in this example, if China’s legitimacy were to decline, Uyghur
groups would likely increase their rate of attack, feeling empowered by gains
in the legitimacy battle.
Gilley’s assertion that legitimacy might best be “relegated to the back-
ground,” relative to internal conflict, is a premature conclusion because the
relationship between legitimacy and terrorism is very complex. Being complex
does not mean we should move it aside. Rather, we need to be more deliberate
in specifying the relationship. Specifically, measures of legitimacy based pri-
marily on majoritarian perspectives may not be the best tool for assessing the
relationship between legitimacy and terrorism.
In this sense, we may need to direct our attention away from affective ori-
entations between the citizens and the state and toward the capacity of the
state to manage crises as they emerge. Reorienting our perspective toward
capacity focuses attention on the means with which states respond to onset
problems and instability (i.e., ethnic war, revolution, genocide, and politicide).
For instance, do people live under the secure rule of law or are widespread vio-
lations of civil and political rights common within the state?33 On the political
front, are citizens included or incorporated into governance, or are there notice-
able patterns of exclusion and discrimination? A focus on capacity delinks the
discussion of legitimacy from mass majoritarian measures related to “rightful
rulers” in order to observe the behaviors attached to the interests of institutions
and how those translate into outcomes. When a state pursues its interests and
runs into opposition from mobilized political actors, how do they respond? Does
the state show a tendency to integrate opposition concerns, responding to them
as legitimate expressions of misgiving and disagreement in order to take all
steps necessary to convince those in opposition of the interests of the state?
In some cases, an opposition group may respond to state actions with resis-
tance, up to and including violence. In this condition, does the state respond
with actions deemed consistent with the political culture? In saying this, we
seek to highlight the reality that some states do respond to terrorist threats
with repressive actions. Repressive reactions to terrorism by itself do not indi-
cate a less legitimate state. If the state’s actions are in line with what a society
expects, possibly even demands, in response to terrorism, then violations of
the rule of law would not indicate legitimacy problems. What matters is con-
sistency. If a state’s response to opposition groups is increasingly repressive,
increasingly discriminatory, we should expect domestic terrorism to increase.
Consider the revolution in Syria as an example. The movement to reform
government and remove Bashar al-Assad from power begins as a protest
movement located primarily in the city of Homs. As state repression esca-
lates, the protest movement turns into a violent revolutionary movement in
many different cities and regions across Syria. As violent revolution set in,
we observed an onset of terrorist violence as part of the strategy. In this
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case, terrorism did not precipitate government repression. Rather, government
repression of the protest movement precipitates the onset of terrorism.
Legitimacy is a difficult concept to employ in the study of political out-
comes. The challenge is heightened even more when we turn our attention to
forms of internal conflict and rely on legitimacy as a potential explanatory vari-
able. Perceptions of low legitimacy may only be reflected in small subgroups
within a larger population. If perceptions of low legitimacy are relegated to
only the subgroup, we should observe some terrorism in a state with high legit-
imacy. But the number of terrorist events per year is likely low and uneven.
In this sense, we should not expect legitimacy to serve as a variable to predict
the occurrence of terrorism. Instead, legitimacy may serve us better to explain
why some states experience more terrorism than others.
DATA, METHODS, AND RESULTS
This study provides an empirical examination of the proposition that low legit-
imacy states experience higher levels of domestic terrorist activity than high
legitimacy states. Legitimacy is a difficult variable to conceptualize and mea-
sure, as indicated by the discussion above. Legitimacy can be operationalized
on the basis of majoritarian perspectives or on the basis of institutional capac-
ities. The primary analysis in this study employs an operationalization based
on institutional capacities using a composite legitimacy score derived from
the State Fragility Index with the raw component parts of the index on a
country-year by country-year basis. Legitimacy scores based on majoritarian
perspectives are exceptionally useful for certain analytical questions. However,
such measures are too insensitive to the opinions of subgroups, making them
imprecise for an assessment on the relationship between legitimacy and terror-
ism. Moreover, data collection on majoritarian legitimacy measures, at present,
have too long of a time lag between data points and inconsistent data collection
to be useful in this particular analysis.34
In order to rigorously examine the relationship between legitimacy and ter-
rorism, this study employs two analyses. The first is a bivariate analysis that
uses descriptive statistics to assess the relationship between a state’s legit-
imacy category and the average number of terrorist incidents per year. The
descriptive analysis is then supplemented by a cross-national, time series anal-
ysis on state legitimacy and its contribution to domestic terrorism (employing
a series of standard control variables in the analysis).
Descriptive Analysis
The point of departure for the analysis is to evaluate the relationship
between the legitimacy category for states and the average number of domestic
terrorist attacks per year (1995 to 2005). The State Fragility Index (SF)
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produced by the Center for Systemic Peace provides annual data on state
fragility for 164 countries with populations greater than 500,000 beginning
in 1995.35 The SF index is a composite of effectiveness scores and legiti-
macy scores for each state assessed over four dimensions: security, political,
social, and economic. This study focuses its attention on these four dimensions
within the legitimacy score side of the SF index so that security legitimacy
measures state repression, political legitimacy measures regime/governance
inclusion, social legitimacy measures human capital care, and economic legit-
imacy measures share of export trade in manufactured goods.36 The scale is
0 to 12, with zero indicating high legitimacy and 12 indicating low legitimacy.
The scale is subdivided into four categories for this analysis. These categories
include Extremely Low Legitimacy states (10–12), Low Legitimacy states (7–9),
Moderate Legitimacy states (4–6), and High Legitimacy states (0–3).
The terrorism data comes from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),
decomposed by Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev into three categories:
transnational and domestic terrorist events, and uncertain events.37 For pur-
poses of this study, terrorism is defined as “the premeditated use or threat
to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants
in order to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large
audience beyond that of the immediate victims.”38 Domestic terrorism, the focus
of this study, is further defined as an event where the target venue and perpe-
trators all come from the same country, where the impact is meant only for
the venue country.39 The definition used here excludes events where the moti-
vation is related to money, extortion, or material gain, which qualifies as a
criminal act.
The decomposition of the GTD is carried out in several stages. The first
involves removing known transnational terrorist events using a five-step pro-
cedure to sift events (a) where the nationalities of the victims differ from the
venue country; (b) where target types represent transnational target states
(e.g., diplomats, foreign missions); (c) where there are attacks against US and
international entities (e.g., UN agencies); (d) when events include US victims
outside the US, US hostages, or US-specific demands; and (e) in the country
where the event has concluded.40 Once the transnational terrorist events are
extracted, the remaining events are uncertain and domestic terrorist events.
Uncertain events are then removed. An uncertain event is defined as one where
there is missing information on the nationalities of the victims, target type,
target entity, and US victims/interests.41 The remaining events are classi-
fied as likely domestic terrorist events; they include events where the venue
country matches the three identified victims of the attack and do not include
diplomatic of multilateral entities. The authors concede that there are some
possible transnational events left in the domestic terrorist data owing to the
fact that the nationality of the perpetrator is not known, which could lead to
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a situation where a transnational terrorist group uses local terrorists to carry
out an attack (for example, the 7/7 London attacks).42
In the period under analysis (1995–2005), there are 29,665 domestic terror-
ist attacks, spread over a potential pool of 1742 country years. When applying
the Legitimacy Score for countries to the decomposed GTD terrorist events
data, we find that the legitimacy category of a state is a significant predictor
for domestic terrorism, with a coefficient of 10.025 (.000 significance). We add
more insights into these findings by showing the average domestic terror-
ist attacks by the legitimacy classification with a Pearson’s r coefficient in
parenthesis (see Table 1). States that rank as “extremely low legitimacy”and
“low legitimacy” have a higher average of domestic terrorist attacks than
states that rank in the “moderate” and “high legitimacy” categories. More
precisely, “extremely low” and “low” legitimacy states are over three times
more likely to have a domestic terrorist attack than “high” legitimacy states.
Furthermore, “extremely low” and “low” legitimacy states are nearly twice
more likely to have a domestic terrorist attack than a “moderately” legitimate
state.
The evidence in Table 1 provides some evidence to support Sprinzak’s claim
that states on the lower end of the legitimacy spectrum are more likely to expe-
rience domestic-level oppositional terrorist attacks. However, the analysis to
this point is only a sketch. The data suggest a correlation between legitimacy
category and domestic terrorism, but we do not gain any insights into causal
direction or impact of legitimacy.
Table 1: Incidents of domestic terrorism by State Fragility
Index (legitimacy scores) classification with correlation
coefficients.
State Fragility Index
Legitimacy (Country-Years)
Average Incidents by
Location (1995–2005)
Extremely Low Legitimacy 9.32 (.057)∗
N = 177
Low Legitimacy 9.25 (.087)∗∗
N = 411
Moderate Legitimacy 5.37 (−.004)
N = 516
High Legitimacy 2.57 (−.109)∗∗
N =638
Note. All correlation coefficients in parenthesis are Pearson’s
r with two-tailed significance tests, where ∗ indicates signifi-
cance at the .05 level and ∗∗ indicates significance at the
.01 level. The difference of means between the defined cat-
egories is significant with an F-statistic 10.025 significant at the
.000 level.
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Multivariate Analysis
The multivariate analysis forms the main test of the hypothesis: low legit-
imacy states experience more terrorist events than high legitimacy states.
The analysis includes five time-series negative binomial regression models
using data from 143 countries from 1995 (or year of independence) to 2005,
producing 1371 observations per model.43 The dependent variable is ter-
rorist events per country-year. It is the nature of the dependent variable
that makes negative binomial regression a preferred modeling tool for this
analysis. The dependent variable is a count variable that cannot include
negative values. Count variables for the dependent variable move us into
the territory of Poisson models. The negative binomial regression (NBREG)
model is selected over a standard Poisson model because terrorist events are
unevenly spread out over time and space, with clusters of attacks taking
place in some countries and in some years that are, in theory, not indepen-
dent of each other, as attacks in one year may lead to more attacks in other
years.44
In the first regression model, the main explanatory variable is the com-
posite state legitimacy score for each state collected from the State Legitimacy
Index. The additional models (2–5) include country-year observations of the
component parts of the legitimacy score: security legitimacy, political legiti-
macy, economic legitimacy, and social legitimacy. The terrorism events data is
drawn from the decomposed Global Terrorism Database.
There are a variety of control variables included in the analysis. Regime
type is operationalized along two dimensions: the impact of institutional
restraints on the executive branch of government and political competition.
Previous studies on the causes of transnational terrorism hold that certain
democratic features of government tend to make states more vulnerable to
terrorist attacks.45 In particular, Li’s study on transnational terrorism finds
that countries with higher degrees of executive constraints experience higher
rates of terrorism, while states with more political participation and competi-
tion experience lower rates of terrorism.46 In short, these variables capture
procedural characteristics of democracy in ways that speak to the intersec-
tion of regime type and terrorism. The executive constraints variable captures
the notion that democratic states may not be able to respond quickly or effec-
tively to terrorist threats, making them vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Political
competition isolates the degree to which the political system allows mobilized
political actors to engage in normal political processes. The assertion is that
more participation and competition diffuses tensions in society, thereby mak-
ing terrorism less viable as a strategy of political engagement.47 What is not
known is the performance of these variables when the focus of the analysis is on
domestic terrorism. There is every reason to believe that the findings related to
transnational terrorism would be consistent for domestic terrorism. States that
cannot respond quickly or effectively may experience higher rates of terrorism,
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and states that diffuse tensions through participation and competition should
experience less terrorism.
Capability is related to the strength of the government. The strength of
the government is related to its military capacity and economy as a percent
of the capability in the international system. Hence, capability is a relative
measure of government strength. The capability measures are drawn from the
Correlates of War (COW) project as measured by the CINC variable (Composite
Index of National Capability).48 The literature on government capabilities is
divided. Studies on transnational terrorism suggest that weaker states will
experience more transnational terrorist events than strong states. Weak states
are more attractive venues for operations.49 However, in the case of domestic
terrorism, the relationship may be the opposite. The logic is to first assume the
rise of an insurgent group. The question is, will the group select guerrilla war-
fare or terrorism? The assertion is that in weaker states, the government and
military cannot exert full control over their territory, giving space for guerrillas
to rise because territorial control is an essential feature of this form of insur-
gency. Meanwhile, in strong states, the insurgents become terrorists because
terrorists groups can operate with minimum territorial requirements.50
Other control variables include durability, history of terrorism, popula-
tion, income, and ethnic fragmentation. Durability is the measure of the years
the current regime has held power. The relationship to terrorism is negative.
Newer regimes, particularly newer democracies, are more likely to experience
terrorism.51 A history of terrorism is an important predictor of terrorist activ-
ity in a state. Terrorist organizations build over time, which makes current
levels of terrorism a function of past terrorist activity.52 To capture history
of terrorism, the variable measures the average number of terrorist inci-
dents in a given country for each of the previous years in the period under
observation. Population is measured as the natural logarithm of the sample
country’s population from Version 5.0 of Gleditsch’s expanded data.53 The liter-
ature suggests that states with larger populations experience more terrorism.
The environment is likely more diverse, which can lead to more intergroup
strife. The complex environment may be more challenging for the state to
manage.54 Income is measured via a country’s gross domestic product derived
from Version 5.0 of Gleditsch’s expanded data.55 Variables related to wealth,
poverty, and wealth distribution show high degrees of inconsistency in the
literature. As such, we take no firm position on the expected direction of the
relationship between income and terrorist events. It is possible to argue that
poverty is related to motivating grievances for terrorism, and people may opt
to act out against the government in response to this grievance, but the liter-
ature simply does not provide clear guidance at this point.56 Finally, studies
on transnational terrorism conclude that homogenous countries experience
fewer transnational terrorist events. Since ethnic conflict is inherently local,
it is safe to assert that fragmented countries would likely experience higher
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levels of domestic terrorism.57 Ethnic fragmentation is measured using the
Ethnic Heterogeneity Index (EHI).58 The EHI uses three characteristics of eth-
nic division to measure the total level of ethnic heterogeneity in a country:
ethnic groups based on racial differences; ethnic groups based on linguistic,
national or tribal differences; and ethnic groups based on stable religious
communities.59 The higher the EHI, the more fragmented the country; the
lower the EHI, the less ethnically fragmented the country. Since ethnic frag-
mentation is relevant to nationalist terrorism, and nationalist terrorism is
one of the more common forms of terrorism, we assert a positive relationship
between ethnic fragmentation and domestic terrorism.
To control for endogeneity, state legitimacy and its component parts (secu-
rity, political, economic, and social legitimacy), executive constraints, political
competition, population and, income are all lagged one year. History of terror-
ism is an endogenous control variable in its construction and is not lagged. All
other variables (durability, capability, and ethnic heterogeneity) are constant
with the country-year.60
RESULTS
The results of the analysis (reported in Table 2) suggest that the main explana-
tory variable (and some of its component parts) performs very well. More
precisely, state legitimacy is a significant predictor of terrorist events, as are
security legitimacy and political legitimacy. However, economic and social legit-
imacy are not significant predictors of domestic terrorism. In Models 1, 2,
and 3, the direction of the legitimacy variables is positive, as predicted, which
suggests that less legitimate states are positively correlated with a high rate
of terrorism (more terrorist events per year). The composite state legitimacy
score (Model 1) accounts for a 13.6 percent change in terrorist events (per-
cent change is not reported in the table) for each unit change in a state’s
legitimacy score. Security legitimacy and political legitimacy are more sig-
nificant contributors to terrorist events, with security legitimacy accounting
for a 114.7 percent change in terrorist events, and with political legitimacy
accounting for 119.9 percent change in terrorist events. These data suggest that
generally less legitimate states experience more terrorist events. More specif-
ically, states that utilize repression as part of its domestic security policy and
exclude different political groups from the governing regime experience much
higher rates of terrorism. At the same time, social and economic legitimacy
are positively correlated with rates of terrorism, but neither variable is signifi-
cant. Taken together, these data support Sprinzak’s assertion that terrorism is
a by-product of a general condition of low legitimacy, and that low political and
security legitimacy matter even more. The control variables are not entirely
consistent with previous analyses, and this does require some explanation.
First, the control variables that performed best include capability, durability,
and history of terrorism. Ethnic fragmentation performs inconsistently and
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opposite the direction predicted, but on balance it is also a significant predictor
of terrorism. The data on capability suggests that stronger states experience
more domestic terrorism than weaker states. The finding deviates from recent
research on failed and weak states and on transnational terrorism.61 However,
the finding it is consistent with the assertion that domestic terrorists are the
insurgents of strong states.62 Also, the finding contradicts recent studies that
assert that the causes of domestic and transnational terrorism are similar.63
However, it is consistent with the conventional wisdom that while the behavior
may be the same (terrorism), the causal conditions between the domestic and
transnational arenas do differ.64
Durability performs as expected. The variable is negative and strongly sig-
nificant. These findings support Eyerman’s claim that newer states experience
more terrorism than more established states. The findings are suggestive of
the notion that terrorism, particularly domestic terrorism, may be a product
of early state-building. In essence, terrorist violence erupts as a new regime
asserts its authority by responding with repression, which is common among
newly emerging states over the past two centuries.65
History of terrorism is also positive and strongly significant, and it accounts
for a 3.5 percent change in the number of terrorist incidents per country. The
data indicate that terrorism today is a function of terrorism in the past. There
are two ways to interpret this statement, neither of which is mutually exclu-
sive. First, the rate of terrorism in the present is a function of the ability of the
terrorist group to build up its organizational capacity. In this sense, if a terror-
ist group can overcome an initial onslaught of repression by its target state,
surviving the early stages of organizational institutionalization, then it is posi-
tioned to sustain higher rates of terrorism over time. Second, once terrorism is
established as a form of political behavior, it can sustain itself within an envi-
ronment. In other words, terrorism may achieve a status as an acceptable form
of political activity. In saying this, we do not assert that terrorism ever becomes
a mainstream form of political engagement; rather, taboos associated with vio-
lent insurgency are dispelled, and over time various political groups may view
the strategy as an acceptable alternative to normal political engagement.
Now we turn our attention to ethnic fragmentation. The assertion in the lit-
erature is that terrorism is often the by-product of intense competition between
ethnic factions. Given that ethnic terrorism is one of the more prevalent forms
of terrorism, it makes sense to assume that ethnic characteristics in a state
would be a significant predictor of terrorism. The findings in this study do not
discount this assertion. The data, however, do suggest that terrorism is less the
product of ethnic fragmentation and more associated with ethnic homogeneity.
The variable is negative and moderately significant in Models 1 and 3, strongly
significant in Models 4 and 5, and not significant in Model 2. In all models, the
direction of the variable is consistent, suggesting that homogenous societies
experience higher rates of domestic terrorism than fragmented societies. The
data suggest that domestic terrorism, while not completely untethered to the
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goal of territorial change, is more focused on goals associated with regime
change.66 That is to say that domestic terrorism is less driven by ethno-
national competition. However, as with the findings on state capabilities, more
investigation is needed before any firm conclusions can be drawn.
The other variables in the analysis are not significant predictors of domes-
tic terrorism. The markers for democratic polities, executive constraints, and
political competition show inconsistent directionality and are not significant.
The findings suggest that domestic political institutions and political processes
are not relevant to the rate of domestic terrorism. Similarly, population and
income are not significant predictors for domestic terrorism in this analysis.
In sum, this study supports Ehud Sprinzak’s assertion that terrorism is an
outcome of low legitimacy. The data suggests that low legitimacy states expe-
rience more terrorist attacks in a given year than do high legitimacy states.
Moving deeper into the data, states that rely on repression (low security legit-
imacy) are not inclusive (low political legitimacy) experience higher rates of
terrorism. Such states tend to be less established, have a history of terrorism,
and have strong capabilities. If they are to extract lessons from this analysis,
states need to be aware of the interaction between terrorism and legitimacy.
As Audrey Cronin asserts, terrorism involves strategies of leverage intended
to undermine the legitimacy of the state. Through provocation, polarization,
and mobilization, the terrorist group attempts to lure states into repressive
responses in order to undermine their legitimacy among the broader popu-
lation. This study does not assert that states avoid repressive responses to
terrorism, as that would be overly idealistic; rather, states need to be cautious
of the often obscured boundary between enhancing security in the face of a ter-
rorist threat and repression that becomes a justification for further terrorist
activity against the state.
CONCLUSION
This study set out to evaluate the relationship between legitimacy and domes-
tic terrorism. The relationship is very complex and difficult to examine
empirically. First, state responses to legitimacy challenges are nonlinear; some
states seek to improve performance, while others look to repressive strate-
gies to empower secure support groups and demobilize challengers. Second,
it is difficult with available data to isolate the conjunction of onset domes-
tic terrorism and legitimacy. The available data is not sensitive enough to
subgroup opinions on state legitimacy in order to determine a causal con-
nection to unreconciled groups that may opt for terrorist strategies to secure
their interests. These challenges leave us with the choice of abandoning legit-
imacy as a causal variable in favor of other, distal, factors to account for
domestic terrorism, or to look for alternative ways to conceive and analyze the
relationship. This study opts for the latter choice.
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Rather than focus attention on legitimacy and terrorism at the onset stage,
we propose to look at the relationship based on rates of terrorism. Additionally,
rather than look at majoritarian-based measures of legitimacy, we utilize mea-
sures that emphasize performance of the state. The gist of the argument is that
terrorists attack states in order to challenge their legitimacy. State responses
to the terrorist attack then reveal the overall position of the state. If the
state responds with polarized, provocative responses to the terrorist threat,
it damages their legitimacy and emboldens the terrorist group to continue its
campaign. The result is higher sustained attacks by the group or groups over
time. By turning to the State Fragility Index, we can disaggregate the data
to focus on state legitimacy and the component parts of legitimacy: security,
political, economic, and social. The findings in this study suggest a strong
relationship between state legitimacy and domestic terrorism. In this first
cut analysis, extremely low and low legitimacy states average over twice as
many domestic terrorist attacks per year as moderate legitimacy states, and
over three times as many domestic terrorist attacks as high legitimacy states.
In the multivariate analysis, state legitimacy, security legitimacy, and political
legitimacy are strongly correlated with domestic terrorism. Moreover, security
legitimacy and political legitimacy account for nearly a 115 and 120 percent
change in the number of domestic terrorist events.
The findings are interesting and add a new dimension to structural expla-
nations for domestic terrorism. By including legitimacy into the discussion, we
move past more static conditions (democracy-autocracy) and now focus more
on dynamic conditions like rising and falling legitimacy. At the same time,
we must be cautious about the findings. These findings are preliminary. The
performance-based variable on legitimacy serves as a work-around solution to
evaluate the relationship between legitimacy and terrorism. Sprinzak’s origi-
nal theory on the relationship between legitimacy and terrorism is anchored
in the area of onset terrorist activity. The current state of legitimacy data does
not allow us to drill down in order to test the relationship at that nexus point.
At present, we can observe the broader relationship between state legitimacy
and domestic terrorism. This is a useful beginning. But we cannot feel com-
pletely confident about the significance of this relationship unless and until
we can evaluate the relationship between perceived state legitimacy, at the
subgroup level, and the onset of domestic terrorism activity.
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